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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FAR EAST

1. Hong Kong official "not optimistic" over Korean peace prospects:

Geoffrey Aldington, Political Advisor to the Hong Kong Government, has told US Consul General McConaughy that he sees' "no sign of war weariness" among the Chinese, nor of a disposition on the part of the Communist

leadership to "come to terms." Aldington believes that Peiping has sold the Chinese people on a "holy war" to defend China's borders and had "added greatly to its stature" by demonstrating its ability to "fight a foreign war against appowerful enemy." McConaughy, who feels that the British official has "greatly overestimated" popular support of Peiping's intervention in Korea, states that "almost all" mainland informants agree that opposition to Peiping is "very general" among all classes except younger students and the regime's own functionaries.

<u>Comment:</u> The basis of Aldington's estimate is not known. Available evidence indicates that popular support for Peiping's domestic and foreign policies is not widespread. However, Peiping's control over the populace appears to be firm, and the regime's new campaign for funds to buy heavy equipment for Korea indicates that the Communists intend to force the Chinese people to contribute increasingly to the Korean venture.

2. Bao Dai's popularity in Vietnam apparently increasing:

| 25X1, | US Minister Heath reports that the presence of 35,000 "highly interested if not deliriously |
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| | enthusiastic" spectators at the 6 June commemora- |
| L | tion of the unification of the Annamese Kingdom |
| | souled this factional as a shuilding success in contrast with the valeties |

marked this festival as a striking success in contrast with the relative apathy shown on a similar occasion a year ago. During a parade of yough delegations and Vietnamese troops before Bao Dai and Premier Huu, the French remained discreetly in the background and no French troops paraded. Heath believes that the size of the crowd indicates

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Bao Dai's increased popularity and testifies to the authority and organizing ability of Premier Tran Van Huu's government.

Comment: This development is the more significant in that Bao Dai's popularity has always been lower in Saigon that in other areas of Vietnam. The favorable popular response testifies also to increasingly harmonious relations between Bao Dai and Premier Tran Van Huu.

NEAR EAST

| tions, if in turn | The UK Foreign Office has indicated to the US Embassy in London that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company will offer some financial assistance to Iran at the start of the forthcoming negotiathe government will agree not to take any provocative areas in connection with implementing the oil nation- |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| alization law dur British Foreign | ing the negotiations. The Embassy reports that the Office has become concerned over the recent increase and anti-AIOC propaganda in Iran. |
| circumstances, since he himself a peaceful soluti however, that M fields. Althoughtone on the matter ment colleagues | Comment: Prime Minister Mossaded, who cerned over his government's straightened financial probably will be tempted by the offer, particularly does not want to take any step which would prevent on of the matter with AIOC. The danger remains, ossaded will not be able to control events in the oil he himself has exhibited an increasingly moderate er in discussing it with Ambassador Grady, his govern have continued to stir up the country with their violent of nationalization. |

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EASTERN EUROPE

| 4. | Collectivization | constitutes | serious | problem. | in | Soviet | Orbit: |
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Reporting on the recent action of the Polish Politburo dissolving a Party District Committee for agricultural collectivization abuses, US Embassy Warsaw comments that this action

is symptomatic of the serious doctrinal and practical problems raised by collectivization in the Soviet Orbit. The Embassy notes as evidence of Communist pre-occupation with this problem: (1) recent modifications of the collectivization program in Poland and Hungary; and (2) airing of collectivization difficulties in Czechoslovakia during the recent Party upheavals.

Comment: Collectivization has been used by the Communists to release manpower for industrial expansion and also as a means of controlling the peasantry. While the former objective has been achieved in part, control of the peasant, particularly in the European satellites, remains a serious problem. This is illustrated by recent steps taken in Bulgaria, which is 52% collectivized, to organize a Party control apparatus within the Ministry of Agriculture to insure the proper functioning of Bulgaria's agricultural production.

5. Additional peasant demonstrations reported in Bulgaria:

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The Turkish press and radio during the past week have reported simultaneous anti-Communist peasant demonstrations throughout Bulgaria. The US Consulate in Istanbul states that "uprisings in Bulgaria have been partially confirmed" by Bulgarian immigrants interrogated in Turkey who state that demonstrations took place in the widely separated cities

of Shuman, Pleven and Svilengrad late in May. The immigrants also stated that anti-regime pamphlets have been recently distributed in

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| | large Bulgarian towns. | |
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
| particular in foreign police position to Indor Allen fe by convincin | will be vindicenterest and apply should be backerthur's in els that the delay the Yugolsavession and that | fficials have he current of ave express ated. Yugo proval Senation to cate will have that US persons. | e generally debate on U sed confide eslav leader or Fulbrig esition to a view all M ve salutary olicy is bas | ht's view tha ggression an arxists alike results in 3 sed squarely | orably to licy and administra- wed with t US d his op- c. Ambassa- lugoslavia on opposi- | |
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LATIN AMERICA .

9. Panamanian Government to penalize ships violating UN embargo:

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Panama would apply to ships of Panamanian registry violating the UN embargo.

Comment: The subtraction of ships under Panamanian registry from the Western flag vessels carrying strategic materials to Communist China would be a substantial contribution to the effectiveness of the UN embargo, since the Panamanian merchant marine iscone of the largest (approximately 900) in the world. Effective enforcement of penalties, however, might reduce the number of ships registered in Panama and thereby cut into the government's revenue from registry and property taxes. Consequently, the degree of enforcement will be a further test of the cooperativeness of the newly installed Arosemena administration.

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